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OTHERNESS AND DIFFERENCE: 
ON THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF RACIAL TOLERANCE 
by 
PANU MINKKINEN* 
1. The Other and Cultural Identity 
As a political and social phenomenon, racist violence has re- 
cently become commonly associated with the disquieting re-emer- 
gence of populist nationalism and neo-fascism in Europe. Young ad- 
herents of the British National Front, frequently identified as 
"skinheads", have been responsible for violent attacks against Asian 
and West African minorities. In France, similar hostility of racist 
nature as well as the persecution f the Jewish population have been 
more or less openly supported by M. Jean-Marie le Pen, leader of the 
local extreme-right party. German youth gangs, often originating 
from the conomically deprived former eastern parts of the country. 
have been accused of harassing immigrant workers of Turkish and 
North African origin. Individual occurrences faithfully mimic an 
elementary structure: youth gangs with explicit or supposed neo-fas- 
cist sympathies and racially motivated violence. 
Racist violence has, naturally, always been a central issue of 
critical jurisprudence. It is a social problem, and in a modem welfare 
state, law is first and foremost conceived of as a means to an end, as a 
just remedy to an annoying disease. But despite its violent nature 
and its alarming political implications, the core of the problem does 
not seem to be the spectacular nature of contemporary acism. Quite 
the contrary, racism has become banal, worldly, matter of fact, a 
normal phenomenon. The myriad of racist images has, indeed, 
"seduced" the referent, made racism itself disappear. But a form of 
normalization is quite evident in the legal sphere proper, as well. 
Racism is not the "evil" it once was. The logic of welfare state legis- 
lation has relativized racism into a social problem among others. 
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Francois Ewald has proficiently depicted the characteristics of
welfare state legislation in his conception of social law. 1 Social law 
resolves disputes through legal settlements, not by differentiating 
between the right and the wrong. The government of racism through 
social law would suggest, firstly, that the conflicting parties are al- 
ready in a mutually obliging contractual relationship. A legal 
evaluation of racism in the welfare state would mean that racial 
violence is a "breach of contract", violating the terms of an agree- 
ment of peaceful co-existence. The co-existence of races is, therefore, 
based on a contract presupposed tobe mutually profitable. Secondly, 
government through social law objectifies racism into a conflictual 
social order that promotes the well-being of society as a whole. In 
this context, Ewald specifically mentions Augustin Thierry's doc- 
trine of race war as a primus motor of historical progress. In this 
conflictual order, all parties possess rights, and conflicting rights 
are balanced through proper government. Racist violence is, accord- 
ingly, a necessary ingredient of social progress. Thirdly, the legal 
settlement conceived by social law requires solidarity and conces- 
sions from both parties of the conflict. This calls for compromises 
vis-a-vis "absolute rights" as well as mutual tolerance. In the reso- 
lution of racial conflicts, all involved parties are sympathized. Le- 
gitimate grounds can be found for the actions of both parties, and this 
tolerance is understood as the credo of the welfare state and its so- 
cial law: 
...on ne doit pas seulement tol4rer la diff4rence, l'alt~rit(~, l'~gale valeur 
de l'autre, mais, ~ son profit, la limite de son droit. Le droit social est 
symbolique d'une soci6t4 de masse o£i, parce que l'espace viendrait 
manquer, chacun devrait apprendre ~ supporter l'autre et ses in- 
41uctables empi~tements. 
[...what has to be tolerated isnot only the difference, the otherness, the 
equal value of the other, but even, for our benefit, the restriction of our 
right. Social law is symbolic of a mass society in which, because space 
is running short, each must learn to put up with the other and his 
unavoidable encroachments.] 2 
1 Francois Ewald, L'~tat providence (Paris: Grasset, 1986), 457-468. In 
English, this section of the book has been published as "A Concept of 
Social Law", in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare 
State (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1986), 40-74. 
2 Ewald, L'Etat, supra n.1, at 462: Ewald, "Concept", supra n.1, at 49. 
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Europe has unfortunately earned to live with her racism or, to 
be more exact, she has never learned to live without it. This 
normality of racism presents the law with a problem: how does one 
regulate racism? How can the normative penetrate into the normal? 
Coinciding with the normalized racist violence described above, 
a new variant of racial tolerance, less overtly political than the 
critique of racism of the decades before, has taken shape. This new 
variant is founded on the ideal of the "global village", and its dis- 
cursive elements are present in, for example, the ecological em- 
phases of the "green" ideology and in the wide interest concerning 
different manifestations of world culture. Perhaps campaigning for 
rain forests or praising third world culture cannot be accounted for as 
explicit critique of racism, but the essential notion of racial esteem 
is, no doubt, present. 
Occidental racial thought has seldom been analyzed by way  of 
its enlightened half, and yet, most attempts to confront racism as a 
social problem must necessarily be based on some conception of racial 
esteem. It would seem, then, that the opponents of racism do not 
know what they are doing or, more accurately, how they are doing 
it. The ideal of the global village is, of course, only one variant of 
racial esteem among others. The common denominator uniting dif- 
ferent variants of racial thought is the opposition intoler- 
ance/tolerance, the self-ironical etymology tolerare connoting, on 
the one hand, that Occidental racial respect has always been a 
matter of enduring, of "putting up with differences "3 and, on the 
other hand, that Occidental racial debate is often of a rather tem- 
pered nature. A racial debate implies a biological meta-logic, a sci- 
ence of the physical and intellectual qualities of the different races: 
racism is always a discourse on the superiority of the subject while 
the critique of racism denies the validity of racial biology in gen- 
eral. Yet both racism and its tolerating opposition require a lan- 
guage, a cultural logic. In other words, the bio-logic of racial dis- 
course, its Iogos of life, is the language it speaks. In one of his few 
explicitly political texts, Jacques Derrida outlines the Iogos of race: 
Pas de racisme sans une langue. Les violences raciales, ce ne sont pas 
seulements des roots, mais il leur faut un mot. Bien qu'il all~gue le 
sang, la couleur, la naissance, ou plut6t parce qu'il tient ce discours 
3 Ewald seems to reserve the attribute of tolerance exclusively for the 
welfare state. See Ewald, L'Etat, supra n.1, at 488-489. 
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naturaliste et parfois cr~ationniste, l  racisme trahit toujours la perver- 
sion d'un homme "animal parlant". I1 institue, d~clare, ~crit, inscrit. 
prescrit. Syst/~me de marques, il dessine des lieux pour assigner ~ rdsi- 
dence ou fermer des fronti~res. I1 ne discerne pas, il discrimine. 
[... there's no racism without a language. The point is not that acts of 
racial violence are only words but rather that they have to have a word. 
Even though it offers the excuse of blood, color, birth - -  or, rather, be- 
cause it uses this naturalist and sometimes creationist discourse 
racism always betrays the perversion of man, the "talking animal". It 
institutes, declares, writes, inscribes, prescribes. A system of marks, it 
outlines pace in order to assign forced residence or to close off bor- 
ders. It does not discern, it discriminates.] 4 
Racial thought - -  be it intolerance or tolerance - -  is inscribed 
into the language of race through a conception of cultural identity. 
In cultural identity, the Occidental subject brings itself into contact 
with a foreign culture or its representative. As it is uttering "I am 
this", the subject must necessarily also affirm that "I am not that, I
am not the other". In the metaphor of race, the foreignness of the 
other is concentrated. A different race presupposes numerous other 
differences as well, and since race is a very stable characteristic, it 
keeps the other at a safe distance. The observation of a foreign cul- 
ture requires the subject o "objectify" the other beyond itself, to per- 
form a distinction between itself and its other. Reflecting on the 
other through and in itself, the subject can acquire a sense of iden- 
tity, define the limits of a cultural terrain where the subject can be 
"what it is. "s 
This structure of ident i ty that can be traced from most 
manifestations of Occidental ethnocentricity is as old as Occidental 
culture itself. It is, however, a relatively weak version of discrimi- 
natory thought. Its structure is still fluid, lacking the constancy and 
unconditional character of racism. The barbaros of Homeric Greece 
Jacques Derrida, "Le dernier mot du racisme", in Psychd. Inventions de 
l'autre (Paris: Galilee, 1987), 353-362, quotation at 355. English trans- 
lation, "Racism's Last Word", Critical Inquiry 12 (Autumn 1985), 290- 
299, quotation at 292. 
In his textbook on legal anthropology, Norbert Rouland defines an- 
thropology as a discourse on otherness and maintains that structuring 
the world as a relationship between the viewing subject and an object 
under observation is primarily an Occidental characteristic. Norbert 
Rouland, Anthropologie juridique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1988), 25-40. 
On the Cultural Logic of Racial Tolerance 151 
could still challenge Hellenic supremacy by refining his accent. 
Ethnocentricity is open: the centre can always be redefined, the al- 
leged boundaries of the periphery redrawn. Intolerance in the form 
of racism and overt discrimination, on the other hand, thrives on a 
stigma, a permanent stain. It requires that the superiority of the 
subject vis-a-vis the other is fixated into a structure with mandatory 
power, a law (nomos) or a name (nomen). 6 This structure reduces ab- 
stract identity into individuality by prescribing the subject a privi- 
leged position, by transforming it into a person. 
In Latin, the etymology of the word persona 7 refers to per sonare, 
"with a mask". In Roman society, the persona was originally a 
character in a dramatic presentation, a personage acted out in a the- 
atrical mask. The mask was also of social significance in the various 
religious rites performed by the families of Roman society. Certain 
members of society were entitled to take part actively in the rites by 
using specific masks. The ritualistic characters displayed with the 
masks included corresponding names, and the entitled users of the 
masks eventually attained a right to use this name. The ritualistic 
right to use a name was later handed down to the next generation of 
the family. Thus the name developed into a legal privilege of the 
family, distinguishing it in a permanent fashion from the non- 
privileged. 
As non-human and inanimate objects of property, slaves were 
deprived of names altogether. On the other hand, the privilege of 
using the sacred name of the gens was restricted to only certain 
patrician families, and it also marked the dividing line between 
Roman citizens and free individuals of foreign origin. In the Senate, 
the pater of the privileged gens was a persona with the right to use 
the corresponding name of his family. However, as a persona, he 
did not only represent himself but also the continuity of his family, 
his ancestry and his posterity. The persona was a representation 
rather than a representative, a simulacrum of someone lse, of the 
other. 
6 The genealogical kinship of nomos and nomen has been noted in, e.g., 
Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im V~Ikerrecht des Jus Publicum 
Europaeum (K61n: Greven Verlag, 1950). 
7 On persona nd name, see Marcel Mauss, "Une cat~gorie de l'esprit 
humain: La notion de personne, celle de 'Moi'", in Anthropologie et 
sociologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), 331-362. 
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This dual characteristic of the persona and the corresponding 
name, that is, the capacity to possess a subjective right and the 
representational relationship between the subject and the other, 
also depicts Occidental ethnocentrism in its fixated structure. 
Racism as intolerance defines the subject as a fixed privilege or right 
and the other as a representation f the subject. But since tolerance is 
always reflected against intolerance, it must accordingly project the 
same structural elements. The evaluative outcome is, of course, very 
different. 
2. The Scientist and the Rule of Tolerance 
A primary variant of racial tolerance can be called tropism, 8
namely, a scientific axiology 9 based on the ideal of cultural plural- 
ism. Prior to the emergence of cultural pluralism, the racial signs 
that established the supremacy of the European race and its culture 
were protected by an unconditional principle. Distinctions between 
races were made by referring to racial origins as if they constituted a 
global caste system with its visible marks of hierarchy. The dis- 
tinctive sign, namely, race and colour, was protected by a cultural 
patent: all manifestations of sophistication and progress in the 
8 In the theory of the nouveau roman, tropism is a term introduced by 
Nathalie Sarraute indicating that the subject displays its true position 
vis-a-vis the other rather through delicate inner movements than 
through outward communicative intentions. Nathalie Sarraute, 
Tropismes (Paris: i~ditions du Minuit, 1957). In the foreword of an En- 
glish translation, Sarraute writes of her choice of concept: "These 
movements, of which we are hardly cognizant, slip through us on the 
frontiers of consciousness in the form of undefinable, xtremely rapid 
sensations. They hide behind our gestures, beneath the words we 
speak and the feelings we manifest ... I gave them this name because of 
their spontaneous, irresistible, instinctive nature, similar to that of the 
movements made by certain living organisms under the influence of 
outside stimuli ... [tropisms] are produced in us by the presence of 
others ..." Nathalie Sarraute, Tropisms and The Age of Suspicion 
(London: John Calder, 1963), 8-9. 
9 In his book on colonialism, Todorov defines axiology as an evaluative 
comparison between races. See Tzvetan Todorov, La conqu~te de 
l'Amerique. La question de l'autre (Paris: l~ditions du Seuil, 1982). On 
racism, see also Tzvetan Todorov, Nous et les autres. La rdflexion 
franqaise sur la diversitd humaine (Paris: l~ditions du Seuil, 1989). 
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other race were deemed illegal and void. Outlawed from cultural 
recognition, the other race could never challenge the supremacy of 
the European subject. 
It is ethnological and anthropological science and its ideal of 
pluralism that first breaks the racist spell and establishes a new 
relativity that can be interpreted as racial tolerance. The same 
tropistic tolerance is still present in the writing of Claude L~vi- 
Strauss. 1° In a text entitled "Race et histoire" from 1952,11 L6vi- 
Strauss affirms that cultural pluralism is the dynamic force of the 
anthropological knowledge he represents. The diversity of cultures 
is a challenge to the monotony of racist prejudices which are unable 
to account for human phenomena: the diversity and richness of cul- 
tures cannot be explained with a biological interpretation of race. 12 
In L~vi-Strauss' tropism, the relationship between the subject of 
science and the other race is an analogy: the other race and its cul- 
tural achievements must simultaneously resemble the subject and 
possess ingular and distinctive traits which can be observed to sat- 
isfy the scientific subject's tolerant curiosity. L~vi-Strauss' text rec- 
ognizes the ethnocentric quality of the analogy13but cannot avoid 
the analogy itself. The tolerance displayed in the text, "a sentiment 
of gratitude and humility", is inspired by a single "conviction", a
tolerant faith: "... c'est que les autres cultures sont diff6rentes de la 
sienne, de la faqon la plus vari~e ... [ ... that the other cultures differ 
from his own in the most varied manner ...]-14 The analogical rela- 
tionship between the races is established by the conviction that the 
other race must always be different in comparison to the subject. But 
convictions and faiths such as tolerance are always tempted by 
10 Derrida's critique of L~vi-Strauss eems to touch upon the theme of 
racial tolerance. See Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: 
l~ditions du Minuit, 1967), 145-202. Would it be, then, more or less jus- 
tified to call L~vi-Strauss' ethnological nai'vet~ tristes tropismes, 
"clumsy pathos"? 
11 Claude L~vi-Strauss, "Race et histoire" in Anthropologie structurale 
deux (Paris: Plon, 1973), 377-422 (hereafter AS). English translation, 
"Race and History" in Structural Anthropology Volume 2 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), 323-362 (hereafter SA). 
12 AS, 377-379; SA, 323-325. 
13 AS, 395-397; SA, 339-340. 
14 AS, 417 [emphasis added]; SA, 358. 
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heretical beliefs. L~vi-Strauss' text names the heresy as false evo- 
lutionism or cultural Darwinism. As a mode of intolerance, the 
heresy attempts to try out the tolerant faith, to annul the diversity 
of human cultures with pretences of absolute knowledge. Is As a de- 
vout believer, the subject of science can never know everything. The 
other race must remain simultaneously familiar and foreign, recog- 
nizable and mysterious. It would be an indication of intolerance to 
annihilate scientific enterprise and tolerant curiosity by knowing too 
much~ by proceeding from partial to inclusive analogy. 
Le procddd consiste donc ~ prendre la partie pour le tout,/t conclure, 
du fair que certains aspects de deux civilisations ... offrent des ressem- 
blances,/t l'analogie de tous aspects. [The process consists in taking 
the part for the whole, concluding - -  because some aspects of both ... 
civilizations present similarities - -  with the analogy of all their as- 
pects.] 16 
Tropism is a textual movement involving a reading of signs suit- 
able for the analogical evaluation of races, and the success of an ac- 
ceptable valuation requires that the racial signs are liberated from 
the pre-scientific unconditional principle. The liberty of cultural 
pluralism does not, however, mean new interpretations of given or 
predetermined signs, of the old caste marks. Tropism is movement 
within an open structure with a luxurious surplus of signifying el- 
ements. In answer to the intellectual demand induced by the subject's 
tolerant curiosity, scientific activity must be able to read new signs 
that make a tolerant evaluation between the races possible. The 
overwhelming plurality of readable signs is also evident in Ldvi- 
Strauss' text. Races are rarely isolated internally or externally and, 
accordingly, the text confirms that diversity is not static. It cannot 
be reduced into a comprehensive inventory of distinctive signs. 17 
Quite the contrary, diversity s always much richer than the scien- 
tific subject's capacity to comprehend, 18 and the extent of cultural 
differences can only be grasped in an incomplete manner, z9 Tropism 
is, therefore, a generative reading of new signifying elements, a 
15 AS, 385: SA, 330. 
16 AS, 388, SA, 333. 
17 AS, 381-382; SA, 327-328. 
18 AS, 380: SA, 326. 
19 AS, 417, SA, 358. 
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production of cultural differences, movement within an open structure 
of superfluous distinctive signs. 
In an analogical relationship, the subject considers the other race 
as a fascinating imitation of natural characteristics, a facsimile 
that feigns the laws of nature. Nature is, then, the axiological scale 
on which the imitation and the original are distinguishable, L6vi- 
Strauss' text does not explicitly identify nature, but i does name 
three categories of culture: the temporally proximate and spatially 
distant, the temporally distant and spatially proximate, and the 
temporally and spatially distant. 2° The remaining category, i.e., 
the temporally and spatially proximate, the here and now - -  L6vi- 
Strauss himself m must accordingly stand for something other than 
culture, for nature. 
The text condemns racial intolerance both as malevolent exclu- 
sion and benevolent inclusion, as rejection from humanity and inter- 
jection eliminating diversities. 21 On the other hand, tropism itself 
can express tolerance only by disregarding differences w something 
which has already been deemed intolerant - -  and focusing on cul- 
tural values that are approximately the same for all men: language, 
technique, art, knowledge, belief and social, economic and political 
organization. 22 Yet, it is obvious that tropism, as it is portrayed in 
the text, can only be formulated through L6vi-Strauss' own natural 
language, technique, knowledge and beliefs. Tropism is a mode of 
racial existence, and as soon as the scientific subject urns its inspect- 
ing gaze on the observed iversities, the existence of the other race 
is necessarily defined by way of the subject and its status as nature. 
As in any variant of racial tolerance, the anti-racist principle 
regulating racial thought in tropism follows a specific normative 
logic: the logic of a rule. This logic is particularly evident in L6vi- 
Strauss' frequent metaphoric allusions to tropism as a game. 23 Intol- 
erance as the inability to read signs of progress in so called 
"primitive" societies is a result of defining the rules of the scientific 
game in an inappropriate way. Intolerance is playing at un- 
20 AS, 387; SA, 332. 
21 AS, 383-385; SA, 328-329. 
22 AS, 401; SA, 344. 
23 On L6vi-Strauss and the game, see Jacques Derrida, "La structure, le 
signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines", inL'~criture t 
la diffdrence (Paris: t~ditions duSeuil, 1967), 409. 
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favourable odds in a game with "contributions" tobe won. The text 
promotes tolerance as playing collectively in order to improve the 
chances of winning. 24 On the other hand, the text defines tolerance 
as giving recognition to the contributions of the other race to the 
common patrimony. 25 But this does not mean the comprehensive 
listing or cataloguing of particular contributions into the estate, it is 
not a legally governed balancing of accounts. The contribution is, in 
fact, an interracial exchange of differences (~cart diff&entieIL 26 
The French word ~cart also signifies an exchange of cards in a game. 
In the game of tropism, the rule of tolerance does not stipulate which 
racial signs require a tolerant reading: the cards of the game must 
remain random and arbitrary. 
The rule of tolerance regulates tropism without being transcen- 
dent in relation to it. The rule is not "above" the game it describes, it
is an immanent part of it. Tolerance is built into L6vi-Strauss' text in 
a way that makes the game, i.e. scientific activity and tropism, 
impossible without observing the rule. Contempt of the rule signi- 
fies exit from scientific truth. 
Quand on cherche /i caractdriser les races biologiques par des pro- 
pri~t~s psychologiques particuli~res, on s'~carte autant de la v~ritd sci- 
entifique n les ddfinissant de fa~on positive que n~gative. [When at- 
tempting to characterize the biological races by specific psychological 
properties, one strays just as much from scientific truth in defining 
them positively as negatively.] 27
The rule of tolerance does not draw a clear dividing line between 
the permitted and the forbidden because it is immanent in the game. 
One can disregard the rule but not violate it, In other words, trans- 
gression in the form of racist intolerance is inconceivable within 
tropism because the rule does not pronounce a moral verdict. The text 
demonstrates this in the apology of racist anthropology and popular 
prejudices: intolerance is "nai've", " ignorant",  "simplistic" and 
"pseudo-scientific" but never explicitly wrong in the moral sense of
the word. The rule of tolerance is not interested in condemnation, it 
merely wishes to secure the continuity of the game. This game - -  
24 AS, 411-413; SA, 353-355. 
25 AS, 377; SA, 323. 
26 AS, 417; SA, 358. The English translation for ~cart diffdrentiel is given as 
"contrastive f atures". 
27 AS, 377 [emphasis added]; SA. 323-324. 
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unlike the text's conception of history - -  is clearly cumulative. 
The tropism the text represents is,no doubt, a sequence of scien- 
tific authors in a cumulative game. But the rule of tolerance itself 
requires no authorization. Both the author and the formulation f 
the rule are insignificant. The text situates the rule in temporal ob- 
scurity by designating the intolerance of a distant predecessor asan 
"intellectual error. "28 An error can only mean that the unobserved 
rule was already present but remained unobserved. Since the prede- 
cessor is the "father of racist theories", 29the rule must precede the 
original insemination. On the other hand, the manifestation f in- 
tolerance in major ethnological texts is done away with as na~vet6 
and "total ignorance". 3° This exclusion of the ignorant child from the 
game of tropism emphasizes that the rule of tolerance is not open for 
imaginative interpretation. If interpretation is ruled out, the 
formulation must be irrelevant. Being morally neutral, the rule of 
tolerance cannot prohibit intolerant conduct. It can only appeal for 
tolerance because disobeying the rule leads to expulsion from the 
game, from tropism and scientific activity. 
The rule of tolerance binds the subject and the other ace together 
in a dual relationship where both presuppose each other. The rule 
does not perform a distinction between the two parties. In addition, 
the rule requires merely unilateral tolerance. The text, expressing 
the feeling of gratitude and humility for the contributions of the 
other race, states that the beneficiary of the contribution cannot be a 
world civilization. 31 How should one, then, understand the "common 
patrimony" mentioned above? A patrimony is a paternal heritage, 
and since the only father mentioned in the text is an intolerant 
scientist, it would seem that the beneficiary can only be a descendant 
in the scientific family line, L~vi-Strauss himself. Therefore, 
tolerance is not displayed by recognizing the contributions of the 
other race to a common heritage but by accepting, albeit gratefully 
and with humiliation, the donor's tribute, a tribal tax. The rule of 
tolerance does not contest the existing privileges of the scientific 
subject and establish cultural equality. Its sole aim is to secure the 
28 AS, 378: SA, 324. 
29 AS, 377: SA, 324. 
30 AS, 405: SA, 348. 
31 AS, 416: SA, 357-358. 
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continuity of the tropistic game and its requirements. 
Notwithstanding the securing of this continuity, the rule of tol- 
erance does not have further objectives of a politico-moral nature. 
The essential topic of L6vi-Strauss' text is racial tolerance dis- 
played in scientific knowledge, and only at the closing pages does 
the text mention a "sacred obligation of humanity" to promote toler- 
ance. Curiously enough, it is exactly the same place where the text 
ceases to speak of scientific enterprise and its own commitments. At 
this point, the text quite innocently transforms itself into a delega- 
tion of regulative intentions from science to international institu- 
tions. 32 The reason for this is the inability of tropism to confront in- 
tolerant behaviour outside its own game. As the transgression f the 
rule of tolerance is inconceivable, the racist counterpart of tropism 
suggests a form of intolerance r gulated by a similar normative logic. 
This would require adherence to another ule, a rule of intolerance. 
It is a ceremonial variant of racism and is perhaps best illustrated 
by the activities of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States and the 
violent youth gangs of contemporary Europe. But the rules of intol- 
erance and tolerance cannot be juxtaposed as they are two different 
games, they are of a different order. In both tropism and ceremonial 
racism, breaking the rule merely expels one from the game without 
moral condemnation. And, as contradictory as it may seem, the cer- 
emonial is also the normal. Just as in ceremonial racist violence, the 
logic of a rule dictates the structures of the most common and every- 
day forms of racist intolerance: offending humour, membership 
criteria of social organizations, the cultural depreciation of non- 
European civilizations, the taboos of interracial sexuality, etc. 
3. The Politician and the Law of Tolerance 
If L6vi-Strauss' text delegates the objective of confronting racism 
to international institutions, it must also presume another variant of 
racial tolerance, advocation 33 or a political axiology based on legal 
32 
33 
AS, 420; SA, 361, 
Advocation or advocacy is here derived from advocare, to avow, to call 
or summon for assistance. It is u ed to describe both the action of the 
avowed and the advowee. John Burke (ed.), Jowitts Dictionary ofEn- 
glish Law.Volume 1 (A-K) (London: Sweet and Maxwell Limited. 1977), 
63. 
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equality. Advocation is the subject's political activity on behalf of 
the other race concerning the latter's political rights and freedoms. 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 34states its advocatory intentions: 
States Parties shall ... take, in the social, economic, ultural and other 
fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate develop- 
ment and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to 
them ...3s 
In other words, the Convention stipulates an obligation for State 
Parties m the subject - -  to act on behalf of unnamed racial groups 
who can only be identified by a certain level of underdevelopment. 
Social, economic and cultural underdevelopment becomes the signi- 
fying element that distinguishes the subject from the other race. The 
common denominator f interracial comparison in advocation is so- 
cial, economic and cultural progress, an evolutionary scale. An em- 
phasis on the economic is conspicuous. The text of the Convention 
defines economic rights by way of work. 
_. the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favour- 
able conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal 
pay for equal work, to just and favourable r muneration ..36 
The right to work also presumes an obligation of labour in ex- 
change for the evolution from economic underdevelopment to the 
status of a full subject. Racial tolerance is displayed by defining this 
right/obligation as just, as binding to all "without distinction of any 
kind, in particular as to race, colour or origin." The free choice of 
employment does not grant the possibility of evading this obliga- 
tion; it merely states that there are options between umerous em- 
ployers. By operating with bilateral rights and obligations, the 
text of the Convention presumes that favourable working conditions 
secure maximum efficiency for the benefit of all concerned. 
In political advocation, the relationship between the subject and 
the other race is based on equivalence, not analogy. The subject and 
the other do not resemble ach other as ontological beings but as 
values. The axiological scale of equivalent values is constituted in 
34 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2106 A (XX) of 21 De- 
cember 1965. 
35 Article 2.2. 
36 Article 5. 
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the market. The political movement for the abolition of slavery, for 
example, would accordingly be founded on the idea that the subject 
and the other race were comparable as to their market value in 
production. The injustice of slavery was evident in the improper and 
intolerant evaluation of the slave's work in the market. The 
Convention's jargon about economic development implies, albeit in a 
very tolerant manner, that the foundation of racially significant in- 
justice is also due to erroneous market evaluations. If the subject is 
the only party to receive profits, the economic potential of the other 
race must either be abused or it has not been properly put to use. The 
subject represents a more or less balanced value in an ideal market 
situation while the other race, requiring "adequate development and 
protection", suffers from certain shortcomings. 
In an analogical relationship, the other race is enigmatic and 
alluring because the subject's capacity to know is necessarily limited. 
In an equivalent relationship, the subject knows everything. The 
other race is as valuable as its potential efficiency on the market 
but, on the other hand, its ability to provoke ontological questions is 
worthless. In its lengthy Preamble, the text of the Convention 
parades the unlimited comprehension and knowledge of the ad- 
vocatory subject. It acts tolerantly "considering" the context, it is 
"convinced" and "alarmed" by the problem of racism and its causes~ it 
'~reaffirms" the just nature of its own political conviction, it is 
"resolved" to act. But as the Convention is open for signature, 37it is 
not exactly clear who the advocatory subject is. If work and produc- 
tion form a single scale of evaluation, the subject and the other race 
are not as distinguishable as before. The analogical relationship 
never questioned the significant difference between the subject and 
the other race while the equivalent relationship already estab- 
lishes a profound resemblance. 
As an analogy of the subject, the other race was also singular and 
unique. As an equivalent of the subject, it is plural and standard. 
The text of the Convention defines the standard as a collection of 
guaranteed rights "without distinction as to race, colour, or national 
or ethnic origin. "38 The tropistic curiosity of exploring the specific 
characteristics of a singular people~ that is, making distinctions as 
37 Article 17.1. 
38 Article 5. 
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to race, colour, and national or ethnic origin, is replaced with a 
political advocation relying on demographic generalizations the 
ultimate aim of which is a "new economic world order". 
The normative logic of the anti-racist principle is obviously 
quite different in advocation: it follows the logic of a law. Unlike 
the rule, the law of tolerance must explicitly designate the signs 
that the subject should heed in order to deem an action tolerant in 
the advocatory sense of the word. The Convention is no game; it is an 
agreement,  a fixed fight that intentionally delineates the possi- 
bilities of hazard and chance. The text must, accordingly, come to an 
agreement on the signs that are to be taken into consideration i ad- 
vocation. The Convention must itself, by way of negation, list the 
variables that are to be respected in racial tolerance: 
... race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the pur- 
pose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human fights and fundamental free- 
doms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of 
public life. 39 
This meticulous pecification of signs suggests that the law of 
tolerance is transcendent in relation to the behaviour it regulates, it
is "above" advocation. Unlike the immanent rule, the transcendent 
law both commands and prohibits. In other words, the law encom- 
passes both lawful and unlawful behaviour, both tolerance and in- 
tolerance. As a law, the text of the Convention first establishes a 
punitive procedure with which State Parties must "undertake to 
pursue by all appropriate means ... a policy of eliminating racial 
discrimination in all its forms. "4° Secondly, the text of the Conven- 
tion obliges State Parties to promote institutional support for toler- 
ant behaviour. 41 The rule was valid for one game only, but the law 
of tolerance both requires tolerance and condemns intolerance and in 
doing so states its intention of regulating racial thought in general. 
The transcendence of the law in relation to advocation draws the 
dividing line between the permitted and the forbidden which was 
the prerequisite for breaking the law, for transgression. In other 
words, intolerance as transgression is possible providing that the 
39 Article 1.1. 
40 Articles 2.1 and 4. 
41 Article 7. 
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anti-racist principle requiring tolerance is by nature a law. Both 
tolerance and intolerance are thus acted out on the same terrain gov- 
erned by a single law. 
Unlike in tropism, the law of tolerance in advocation presup- 
poses a law-giver whose identity is never insignificant. Most of the 
Convention's Preamble is dedicated to emphasizing that the advo- 
catory agreement has been reached under the auspices of the United 
Nations. If the text itself possessed sufficient mandatory power, 
this emphasis would be pointless. The law of tolerance, however, 
requires a contextual uthor, an outside authority to furnish the text 
with coercive force. The law of tolerance must encompass behaviour 
that is, strictly speaking, outside its own jurisdiction. As an agree- 
ment, the Convention isonly a promise given by the agreeing parties, 
but as a law, it must also evaluate the conduct of those who have 
never committed themselves to it. In addition, the law of tolerance 
is open for interpretation. Advocation is often precisely the presen- 
tation and justification of tolerant interpretations of the law, and 
the text of the Convention reaffirms this possibility by specifically 
ruling out interpretations of an intolerant nature. 42 
As a law, the ratified Convention bears a certain date of entering 
into force. 43 This implies that the law of tolerance is valid only 
from a certain time. The law of tolerance that the text of the Con- 
vention represents i , however, explicitly announced as universal. 44
Despite its extensive and minute formulations of procedures of vali- 
dation, the Convention only briefly touches on the possibility of 
invalidation after the ratification of the law. 4s Hence, the tempo- 
ral dimension of jurisdiction is more or less left open concerning both 
the past and the future. Because the law of tolerance both commands 
and prohibits, one cannot, as in a game, escape the spatial dimension 
of jurisdiction by violating the law. It would seem that even by re- 
sisting ratification of the Convention, a State Party or any non- 
agreeing outsider is transgressing the law. This absurd generality 
gives the law of tolerance the universality of a natural law. 
The law of tolerance stablishes an equality of a legal nature 
42 Article 1.3. 
43 Article 19. 
44 Preamble. 
45 Article 21. 
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between the subject and the other race. But before doing so, the law 
must first make a distinction. As the subject and the other race are 
equivalent in advocation, there is, strictly speaking, only one party. 
The only way to accomplish the distinction between the two parties 
is to identify the discriminated. Regardless of its benevolent inten- 
tions, the law of tolerance must itself perform a discriminatory act. 
The text of the Convention must do what it prohibits, namely, make 
a distinction between "human beings" as to race, colour, or national 
or ethnic origin". After the distinction is made, the law of tolerance 
binds the subject and the other race in a cohesive fashion: tolerance 
requires reciprocal tolerance. The text itself anticipates the 
rhetorical potential of this reciprocality by regulating the proce- 
dures of dispute. 46
Unlike the rule, the law of tolerance has a far more important 
objective than the regulation of racial relationships. Tolerance is 
not even the primary objective of the law. The telos of the law of 
tolerance is a political project, interracial brotherhood: 
... discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race, colour 
or ethnic origin is an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among 
nations and is capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples 
... the existence of racial barriers is repugnant to the ideals of any 
human society ...47 
The renowned inefficiency of international conventions in regu- 
lating everyday life is based on yet another problem of correlation. 
The logical intolerant counterpart of advocation is a political vari- 
ant of racism such as South African apartheid, and conventions and 
agreements have, no doubt, demonstrated their relative usefulness in 
regulating it. But if everyday intolerance, the normal and common- 
place aspect of racism, is of a ceremonial nature, it is regulated by a 
rule of intolerance. Once again we encounter the problem of juxtapo- 
sition: a law is irrelevant in relation to behaviour egulated by a 
rule. As long as the spell of the racist game lasts, the law is power- 
less. And yet, the racial tolerance xhibited in everyday lives must 
be guided by some normative lement. 
46 Article 22. 
47 Preamble. 
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4. The Humanist and the Norm of Tolerance 
The rules and laws of tropism and advocation may be inadequate 
in regulating intolerance, but the extent of racial respect in contem- 
porary society must imply that something or other governs racial 
thought in the Western world. This third variant of racial toler- 
ance, the tolerant counterpart of our intolerant starting point, is 
globalism or a pseudo-axiology based on the ideal of communitarian 
humanism. Globalism is perhaps best portrayed in the ability of 
the advertising industry to annul the signs of racial difference. Dur- 
ing the last few years, the trademark Benetton has illustrated this 
globalism in their advertising campaign picturing the races of the 
world together dressed in uniform clothing. 48 In the globalism of 
Benetton, the other race is not merely a "brother" in the meaning of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The subject and the 
other race are family in a considerably more literal sense: they are 
homogeneous, they originate from the same gene, they are identical 
twins. 
Globalism renders the other race into a perfect simulation of the 
subject. They can be told apart only by a structural difference which 
is altogether neutral and formal. Therefore, the scale of evaluation 
is pseudo-axiological and the races invaluable in the literal mean- 
ing of the word. The operational nd digital logic of structuralistic 
oppositions eliminates all myths of origin and the remaining in- 
equalities in racial relationships. The black, white, yellow and red 
races of the Benetton campaign are as indistinguishable as the bril- 
liant garments: they are clones of a single model and can be told 
apart only by a formal cryptogram known solely to the Creator. In 
its campaign, Benetton has never differentiated its merchandise by 
naming specific models. The races also remain unnamed, and with- 
out a name, subjectivity and otherness as a structure of identity is in- 
conceivable. At last. tolerance is comprehensive! 
In tropism, the tolerance of the subject was triggered by scientific 
curiosity, the fascination of the game, whereas the advocatory sub- 
ject was more like a Pavlovian dog, a political animal conditioned to 
react to the stimulus of abnormal market situations. What, then, 
motivates the subject in globalism? The cultural ogic of globalism 
48 E.g.. United Colors of Benetton, product catalogue, Spring 1991. pho- 
tographs by O. Toscani (Milano: Amilcare Pizzi, !990). 
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has been accurately described by Jean Baudrillard. 49 As the encom- 
passing globalism begins to abolish differences, the subject faces a 
dilemma. In a homogeneous world, there are no differences to toler- 
ate or discriminate. On the other hand, the subject can no longer find 
the limits necessary for the original distinction or its own subjectiv- 
ity. As the subject is fading into oblivion, a panic reaction follows. 
The subject commences toproduce new differences inorder to save it- 
self and the other race from the terror of simulation. The 
schizophrenic frenzy of globalism is the compulsion to be simultane- 
ously the same and different. 
This is the core of our problem: otherness and difference are not 
akin. In the relationship between the subject and the other race, 
otherness signifies the radical dissimilarity that can never be over- 
come. Otherness is conspicuous in, for example, the striking 
disinterest of non-Occidental civilizations regarding the cultural 
traits of the European world. The other will always be incompre- 
hensible, and cultural identity requires that it remain so. Differ- 
ence, on the other hand, is concurrent similarity and dissimilarity, 
inclusion and exclusion. Occidental racial tolerance isnever founded 
on otherness, it is always a discourse on difference: the other race is 
the same and different, recognized and discriminated. As the 
compulsion to tolerate draws the other race closer and closer, it 
reaches a point where all differences have been done away with. 
The tolerance of globalism anifests this hyper-resemblance in its 
anti-racist principle. It proclaims the universal right to be different 
in its beautiful slogan: "We are all different". At the same time, it 
must acknowledge the universality of difference: "In our difference, 
we are all the same". The universal right to difference is embodied 
in Benetton's metaphoric reference to form of government: the right 
to difference is the essential content of the Constitution of the 
"United Colours of Benetton". 
In globalism, the constitutional right of difference is present in 
numerous phenomena of contemporary everyday life: Nicaraguan 
coffee, Vietnamese take-away, Live Aid, Algerian wine, Indian 
cotton, Afghanistan hashish, Turkish delight, Kama Sutra, Zen, 
Argentine tango. The humanist of globalism understands the world 
49 Jean Baudrillard, La transparence du Mal. Essai sur les phdnom~nes 
extremes (Paris: Galilfie. 1989), 129-143. 
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as a collection of human accomplishments that the subject must learn 
to respect as its own. Intolerant universality is finding the latent 
presence of the subject when it is manifestly absent in the other race, 
taking difference for deficiency. 5° The tolerance of globalism, on the 
other hand, interprets the difference of the other race as omething 
that the subject does not possess. Although the defect has been 
turned around, the entity the difference represents i , however, an 
unquestionable phenomenon i  a universal world. 
In this tolerant universality, the anti-racist principle proclaim- 
ing the constitutional right to difference and guiding the subject o 
acquire and interject he difference of the other race into its own life 
is a norm. The norm of tolerance, unlike the rule or the law, does not 
require observation, nordoes it command or prohibit. It functions by 
way of supervision, deterrence, dissuasion and persuasion. The sub- 
ject displays its tolerance by integrating the difference in a situation 
that is not obliging. 
Ceaselessly and compell ingly producing new differences to 
tolerate and integrate, globalism homogenizes the world until it is 
totally universal. Born of the same gene, the other race comes dan- 
gerously close. Thus, the tolerance of globalism accelerates the very 
logic of racist intolerance itself. If the other race is the other, that 
is, radically different, singular, incomprehensible and unattainable, 
the subject has nothing to fear. But once the world has been homoge- 
nized, the compulsory production of differences necessarily takes on 
a racist form: "I am not the other! "51 The indistinguishability of
homogeneous clones is, in the end, confronted with the ultimate me- 
taphor of racism. An "alien" may have once been merely illegal, but 
Baudrillard correctly notes that today it is also a viral monster that 
spreads into society by reproducing itself like HW. The viral meta- 
phor has always served as the essence of racist theories uch as Zi- 
onist conspiracy and, more lately, the rise of the Islamic world. The 
other race incubates in the healthy organs of humanism, but even- 
50 On the technique of universalization, see, e.g., Giles Deleuze and F~lix 
Guattari, Capitalisme et schizophr~nie. Anti-Oedipe, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1972), 2O2. 
51 This strange fluctuation between the s lf and the other resembles what 
Foucault describes as the dialectic of sympathy and antipathy. Michel 
Foucault,  Les mots et les choses. Une archdologie des sciences hu- 
maines (Paris: Gallimard, 1966). 38-40. 
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tually it will hatch and, in doing so, terminate the life of its host. 
5. Illiteracy 
This acceleration is the key to Baudrillard's critique of racial 
tolerance. Even though the critique of racism has confirmed the fal- 
lacy of the biological foundation of discrimination, racism has not 
made way for a tolerant form of interracial relations. Quite the 
contrary, racism has fragmented into small and isolated forms of 
everyday incidents that the latest form of tolerance, globalism, 
seems only to accelerate. A uniform critique of this fragmented nor- 
mality is impossible. The critique presented in the name of racial 
tolerance is always formal in that it only touches the surface. This 
is why racism outlives its critique. Critique may have proven the 
biological fallacy of discrimination, but it has never discredited 
racial biology. Critique may have touched upon the racist obsession 
of difference, but it has not indicated the hazardous logic of differ- 
ence itself. Racial tolerance is a dream of using the logic of differ- 
ence for benevolent purposes, but difference will always lead 
straight back to racism. This is why the West must rediscover the 
other, the radically different. 
Occidental anti-racist critique considers the universal recogni- 
tion of human rights as a victory of the other race. But it is, of 
course, an Occidental triumph. The entire world has recognized the 
universality of Occidental values. The victory of the rest of the 
world can be seen in the vulnerability and helplessness of the Occi- 
dental world when confronted by phenomena such as world culture. 
But the mysteries of the New World are no secret because no one 
hides the answer. On the contrary, through its cultural exchange 
programmes, the Occident spends enormous amounts of money to im- 
port answers for all to inspect, to understand. But it is unable to read 
the answer. All analysis and reasoning leads to new questions until, 
in the end, these questions turn into a doubt and a critique of the sub- 
ject's own culture. This culture, tormented by its sense of inferiority 
and illiteracy, constitutes the last primitive people of this world. 
